I test whether and how taxes affect shareholder wealth around the dividend policy change announcements. I control for the magnitude of the dividend tax penalty and the identity of a tax advantaged investor, proxied for by the level of institutional ownership. I find that 1) the dividend tax penalty erodes the positive wealth effect of dividend; and that 2) the presence of a tax advantaged marginal investor mitigates the negative dividend tax effect. My results offer strong support for the notion of the dividend tax capitalization. I contribute to the literature by separating the dividend tax effect from its information effect.
Introduction
In the United States, dividend incomes are traditionally taxed at a higher rate than capital gains incomes.
1 If dividend distributions are subjected to a higher tax rate than capital gains distributions, then investors receive a tax-related penalty. This is called the dividend tax penalty. In equilibrium, this tax penalty should be capitalized into stock price so that investors are compensated for investing in dividend paying stocks (Brennan (1970) ). That is, highly taxed dividend paying stocks should have lower values, or in other words, they should provide higher rate of returns. Various research methods have been designed to detect whether the dividend tax penalty is incorporated into stock price.
After more than three decades of intensive research effort, no consensus has yet emerged (Fama and French (1998) ).
In an event study framework, I explore evidence of the dividend tax capitalization by examining the changes in shareholder wealth around the announcements of dividend policy changes during a 12-year period from 1989 to 2000. Previous research finds a positive relation between changes in dividend policy and changes in shareholder wealth.
Since the dividend tax penalty has a negative effect on shareholder wealth, a positive relation between changes in dividend policy and changes in shareholder wealth found in the literature may have masked the negative effect of the dividend tax penalty. In fact, it 1 On May 28 th , 2003, the passage of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA 2003) reduced the maximum tax rate on dividend from 38.1% to 15%. In fact, the same 15% maximum tax rate that applies to net capital gain also applies to dividends paid by most domestic and foreign corporations after December 31 st , 2002. Certain dividends from regulated investment companies (such as mutual funds), real estate investment trusts, and certain foreign corporations do not qualify for the reduced rates. This tax regime change greatly reduced the magnitude of the dividend tax penalty.
suggests that the positive information or agency cost effect of dividend overwhelms its negative tax effect (Kallapur (1994) and Fama and French (1998) ). Since theoretically, dividend has these two opposing effects on asset prices, it is important to separate one from the other.
I expect that a generally higher tax rate on dividend incomes relative to capital gains incomes erodes the information or agency cost effect of dividend. Further, this negative tax effect of dividend is alleviated by the presence of a marginal investor whose dividend incomes are tax advantaged or less tax disadvantaged.
To test the first hypothesis, I use two measures of dividend tax penalty. The first relies on tax regime changes; the second is based on the relative taxation of dividend and capital gains incomes for individual investors over time (see Poterba and Summers (1984) ). I find that as the magnitude of the dividend tax penalty increases, the wealth effect per unit of change in dividend yield decreases, consistent with a dividend tax penalty eroding the positive information or agency cost effect of dividend. To test the second hypothesis, I use the level of institutional ownership to proxy for the likelihood of a tax advantaged marginal investor (Ayers, Cloyd and Robinson (2002) and Dhaliwal, Li and Trezevant (2003) ). I find that the higher the level of institutional ownership, the lower the negative tax effect of dividend on shareholder wealth. I contribute to the literature in two ways. First, I provide evidence that dividend taxes negatively impact equity value around the dividend policy change announcements. Prior research has not detected the capitalization of the dividend tax penalty in this setting. My results offer strong support for the notion of dividend tax capitalization. Second, I
separate the negative dividend tax effect from its positive information or agency cost effect around its change announcements. This offers a fuller picture of the valuation implications of dividend. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review the literature and develop hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, variables and test design. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Literature and hypothesis development
There has been much debate both in the theoretical and empirical literature concerning the tax implications of dividend on equity valuation. In theoretical work, Brennan (1970) maintains that a generally higher tax rate on dividend relative to capital gains represents a penalty for which the investors must be compensated. He demonstrates that the expected return for a common stock must be increasing in its dividend yield. On the other hand, Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue that a clientele effect can exist in a world of differential taxes where each firm attracts a certain type of investors. That is, high dividend yield stocks attract investors in low tax brackets and low dividend yield stocks attract investors in high tax brackets. In the extreme, firms adjust their dividend policies until they coincide perfectly with the preferences of the investors. In equilibrium, dividend has no valuation effect. Unifying dividend policy and debt policy, Miller and Scholes (1978) offer the strong dividend invariance proposition without resorting to the perfect dividend tax clientele argument. Individuals can avoid dividend taxation by leveraging themselves to a point where tax-deductible interest expenses completely offset taxable dividend incomes. This way, dividend again does not impact stock value. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy's (1979 , 1980 and 1982 tax clientele CAPM story bridges Brennan's (1970) after-tax CAPM and Miller and Modigliani's (1961) Empirical research in this area also yields conflicting results. Black and Scholes (1974) find no association between expected return and dividend yield and they attribute this finding to firms' making supply-side adjustments to cater the preference of different investors.
3 Fama and French (1998) find a positive relation between share value and dividend, contrary to the dividend tax hypothesis. 4 They infer that dividend conveys information about profitability missed by a wide range of control variables and that this information effect obscures its tax effect.
Other empirical studies find a tax-related valuation effect of dividend. Blume (1980) shows a positive relation between stock return and dividend yield for dividend-paying stocks. 5 Poterba and Summers (1984) also find evidence that taxes impact the valuation of dividend. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979 , 1980 and 1982 find a positive relation between stock return and dividend yield and that the magnitude of this relation decreases when dividend yield increases. They attribute this relation to the dividend tax clientele effect.
6
In event study setting around tax law changes, Erickson and Maydew (1998) find that preferred stocks react negatively to the 1995 proposed reduction in the dividends received deduction, suggesting implicit taxes on preferred stocks. Lang and Shackelford (2000) find evidence of the capitalization of capital gains taxes around the passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003) show that personal capital gains holding-period incentives affect equity price and trading volume around earnings announcements. Guenther (1994) finds that the treasury bill yield spreads respond predicatively to tax rate reductions in 1981 and 1986, supporting the notion of the capitalization of taxes into asset prices.
7
Another line of dividend research examines the relation between information asymmetry and firm value. Due to the existence of information asymmetry between managers of the firm and its outside investors, changes in dividend have information 5 Blume (1980) also has a puzzling finding that non-dividend paying stocks actually have higher return, contrary to the tax effect. This difference may be due to the difference in information environment between dividend paying and non-dividend paying stocks. 6 Elton and Gruber (1970) , studying the ex-dividend day behavior of stock prices, find that the ratio of cum-and ex-day price differential and the amount of dividends distributed is on average lower than one and that it increases with the level of dividend yield. They also attribute this to the dividend tax clientele effect. Kalay (1982) finds similar results after considering transaction costs, intra-day movement of stock price and the behavior of short-term traders who have no tax differential on dividends and capital gains. 7 A recent debate concerns the extent of dividend tax capitalization. Harris and Kemsley (1999) , Collins and Kemsley (2000) and Harris, Hubbard and Kemsley (2000) argue for the full dividend tax capitalization of retained earnings. However, Hanlon, Myers and Shevlin (2003) and Dhaliwal, Erickson, Frank and Banyi (2003) show that their model is flawed by pointing out other possibilities, such as deferred distributions being taxed at a low capital gains rate, the signaling and agency costs argument of dividends, etc.. content (Miller and Modigliani (1961) ). Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985) Two recent studies (Ayers, Cloyd and Robinson (2002) and Dhaliwal, Li and Trezevant (2003) ) argue that to detect the tax effect of dividend, both a firm's dividend payout policy (dividend yield) and its ownership structure (institutional ownership) have to be taken into consideration simultaneously. The reason why the level of institutional ownership is useful in detecting the capitalization of the dividend tax penalty is that it proxies for the identity of a tax advantaged or less tax disadvantaged marginal investor.
Unlike individual investors, for institutional investors, dividend incomes are on average less tax disadvantaged or even tax advantaged relative to capital gains incomes (Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) , Dhaliwal, Erickson and Trezevant (1999) ). Also, Sias and Starks (1997) provide evidence that the likelihood of an investor being the marginal investor is positively related to its percentage holding of a firm's common stock. Base on the above, Ayers, Cloyd and Robinson (2002) and Dhaliwal, Li and Trezevant (2003) argue that as the level of institutional ownership increases, the likelihood of a tax advantaged or less tax disadvantaged marginal investor increases. Ayers, Cloyd and Robinson (2002) I examine how the dividend tax penalty and stock ownership structure interact to impact shareholder wealth around dividend policy change announcements. I choose to study dividend change announcements because they are salient firm-specific events from which the effect of dividend taxes can more likely be detected. Lang and Shackelford (2000) and Ayers, Cloyd and Robinson (2002) study events common to all firms. In these two studies, a firm's dividend policy is taken as given while the macroeconomic environment (tax law) changes. I examine how the market value of common stocks responds to an important firm-specific event.
Base on Ayers, Cloyd and Robinson (2002) and Dhaliwal, Li and Trezevant (2003) , I
use the level of institutional ownership to proxy for the identity of the marginal investor.
When the level of institutional ownership is low, the marginal investor is likely to be an individual whose dividend incomes are tax disadvantaged relative to capital gains incomes. That is, when the level of institutional ownership is low, the dividend tax effect and information/agency cost effect work in the opposite directions. When the level of institutional ownership is high, the marginal investor is likely to be an institution whose dividend incomes are tax advantaged or less tax disadvantaged. That is, when the level of institutional ownership is high, the dividend tax effect is mitigated or even works in the same direction as its information/agency cost effect. 8 The purpose of this study is to separate the dividend tax effect from its information/agency cost effect by showing that 1) the dividend tax penalty reduces the positive information/agency cost effect of dividend; 2) the presence of institutional investors mitigates the negative tax effect of dividend. The first hypothesis that I test is:
H1: To the extend that the tax rate on dividend incomes is generally higher than that on capital gains incomes, the dividend tax penalty reduces the positive association between the changes in dividend policy and the changes in shareholder wealth around the dividend policy change announcements.
On the other hand, as argued earlier, as the likelihood of a tax advantaged or less tax disadvantaged marginal investor increases, the negative valuation effect of the dividend tax penalty will diminish. Thus, the second hypothesis that I test is:
H2:
To the extent that the dividend tax penalty reduces shareholder wealth around the dividend policy change announcements, the presence of a tax advantaged or less tax disadvantaged marginal investor mitigates this negative effect.
In the following analysis, I use tax regime changes and Poterba and Summers's (1984) measure of the relative taxation of dividend and capital gains to proxy for the changes in the magnitude of the dividend tax penalty. I use the level of institutional ownership to proxy for the likelihood of a tax advantaged marginal investor.
Data, variables and test design

Data sources
This study covers a 12-year period from 1989 to 2000. I focus on changes in quarterly dividend policies. I include only quarterly dividend announcements because 95.54% of all regular cash dividend announcements in CRSP are quarterly announcements. Studies by Bajaj and Vijh (1990) and Dhaliwal, Li and Trezevant (2003) both examine only quarterly dividends. I exclude dividend initiations because I intend to examine already established dividend policies. I exclude dividend omissions because CRSP does not provide dates for them, even if the board of directors explicitly announces that dividends will be omitted (see Bajaj and Vijh (1990) ).
In order to quantify dividend policy changes, I compute the change in dividend yield.
I require dividend per share data for both the current quarter and the previous quarter. If there is a stock split or stock dividend between the current quarterly dividend announcement and the previous one, I exclude them from the analysis. This way, I isolate 15,452 dividend change announcements from the CRSP dividend file. For each dividend policy change event, I require daily stock return and market return data from day -60 to day 5 relative to the announcement, stock price and market capitalization on day -1 relative to the announcement. This leaves me with 14,090 quarterly dividend change announcements.
The beginning-of-the-year aggregate level of institutional ownership is obtained from the Spectrum Compact Disclosure data base. Institutional investors include banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, college endowment funds, corporate investors, pension and retirement funds, broker dealer, and other investment advisors. After merging the dividend change announcements with institutional ownership data, I obtain a final sample of 9,748 observations.
Variables
The dependent variable is the three-day (day -1, 0 and 1 relative to the dividend change announcement) cumulative abnormal return CAR. Daily normal return is obtained from a CAPM type regression. Specifically, daily stock return is regressed on daily CRSP value-weighted return during a 55-day period from day -60 to day -6 relative to the dividend change announcement in the following manner:
where 
where it αˆ and it βˆ are the estimates of it α and it β for stock i around the dividend change announcement day t.
The first independent variable of interest is the change in dividend yield. I use a naïve model to gauge dividend change, that is, the expected dividend per share is the dividend per share in the previous quarter. The measure of change in dividend yield CYIELD is:
where DIV it is dividend per share for stock i in the current quarter and DIV it-1 is dividend per share for stock i in the previous quarter and PRICE it is the stock price for stock i on day -1 relative to the dividend change announcement.
The second independent variable of interest is the level of institutional ownership
INST. It is computed as the total number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding.
Apart from these two independent variables, I also construct four control variables.
The expected dividend yield EYIELD is the announced dividend per share in the previous quarter scaled by the stock price on day -1 relative to the current dividend change announcement. I include expected dividend yield as a control variable because Bajaj and Vijh (1990) argue that the information effect of dividend change is increasing in the expected dividend yield due to an assumed existence of dividend clienteles. 9 In my study,
I use a combination of the level of institutional ownership and tax regime changes (or the PENALTY variable, explained below) to specifically control for taxes on dividend. Since I have a more direct control for dividend taxes, I expect EYIELD to have no effect on shareholder wealth.
The change in dividend per share CDIV is the change in dividend per share in the current quarter from the previous quarter scaled by the dividend per share in the previous quarter. Size of the stock CAP is its market capitalization on day -1 relative to the dividend change announcement. To control for liquidity, I use the inverse of stock price 1/PRICE on day -1 relative to the dividend change announcement. These three variables are also used in Bajaj and Vijh (1990) . Since CDIV may to a certain extent capture dividend surprises apart from the change in dividend yield, I expect it to be positively related to CAR. Bajaj and Vijh (1990) find the stock price to be negatively related to CAR, I expect the effect of 1/PRICE to be positive. Larger firms may have more severe agency cost problem, an increase in dividend should have a larger wealth effect for these firms. Base on this, I expect the sign for CAP to be positive.
Test design
The testing of Hypothesis 1 and 2 requires measuring the dividend tax penalty. I use two approaches to measure the dividend tax penalty. The first approach relies on tax regime changes. The second approach measures the magnitude of the dividend tax penalty (the relative taxation of dividend and capital gains incomes) over time.
I first examine how tax regime changes impact the information/agency cost effect of dividend changes. The time span of my data covers three tax regimes, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA93) and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97). 10 In the TRA86 regime, the tax rates on dividend and capital gains incomes are equalized or are very close to each other (zero or 3% difference); in the RRA93 regime, the rate on dividend incomes was increased from 31% to 39.6%; in the TRA97 regime, the long-term capital gains tax rate for individual investors was decreased from 28% to 20%. See Table 1 for details of these three tax regimes. 11 Since the spread of tax rates on dividend and capital gains incomes widens over this 12-year period, the dividend tax penalty increases, thus the wealth effect per unit of dividend yield change should decrease over these three tax regimes. I run the following regression to test this argument:
where T93 equals 1 if the year of the quarterly dividend announcement is after 1992 but before 1997, and 0 otherwise; and T97 equals 1 if the year of the quarter dividend announcement is after 1996, and 0 otherwise. This regression model is run for the full sample and subsamples based on low, medium and high levels of institutional ownership.
Since dividend increases have information content or reduce agency costs, I expect the coefficient on CYIELD to be positive. As discussed earlier, the magnitude of the dividend tax penalty increases over the three tax regimes, I expect the coefficient on CYIELD·T93 and CYIELD·T97 to be negative with the coefficient on CYIELD·T97 more negative than that on CYIELD·T93. In subsample tests, when the level of institutional ownership increases, the coefficients on CYIELD·T93 and CYIELD·T97 should increase.
That is, as the marginal investor becomes more and more likely a tax advantaged or less tax disadvantaged investor, the dividend tax penalty diminishes.
I also interact INST with CYIELD, CYIELD·T93 and CYIELD·T97 and run the following regression:
I expect the coefficient on CYIELD to be positive, the coefficients on CYIELD·T93
and CYIELD·T97 to be negative with the coefficient on CYIELD·T97 more negative than that on CYILED·T93. I expect the coefficients on CYIELD·T93·INST and CYIELD·T97·INST to be positive with the coefficient on CYIELD·T97·INST more positive than that on CYIELD·T93·INST. This is because, if the presence of institutional investors reduces the dividend tax penalty, it reduces more dividend tax penalty when the penalty is high. The second approach to controlling for the dividend tax penalty is to measure the relative taxation of dividend and capital gains incomes in the following manner:
12 Gillian and Starks (2000) find that shareholder proposals sponsored by institutions or through coordinated activities receive significantly more favorable votes than those sponsored by independent individuals or religious organizations. Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) show that TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance Annuity Association -College Retirement Equities Fund) is able to influence corporate governance issues successfully through private negotiations with firms' management. Bushee (1998) shows that managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings decline when the level of institutional ownership is high, implying that institutions are sophisticated investors who typically serve a monitoring role in reducing pressures for myopic behavior. These studies suggest that institutional investors positively influence corporate governance practice.
where t d is the tax rate on dividend (ordinary) incomes and t g is the tax rate on capital gains incomes for individual investors. This measure is developed in Brennan (1970) and Poterba and Summers (1984) . Since the spread between the tax rates on dividend and capital gains incomes increases over the three tax regimes, the value of PENALTY increases over time (see Table 1 ). To test the effect of PENALTY, I run the following regression for the full sample and for the subsamples based on low, medium and high levels of institutional ownership:
I expect the coefficient on CYIELD to be positive due to the information content of dividend and the coefficient on CYIELD·PENALTY to be negative due to the tax effect of dividend. In subsample tests, when the level of institutional ownership increases, the coefficient on CYIELD·PENALTY should increase.
I also interact INST with CYIELD and CYIELD·PENALTY and run the following regression:
I expect the coefficient on CYIELD to be positive, the coefficient on CYIELD·PENALTY to be negative and the coefficient on CYIELD·INST·PENALTY to be positive, due to the dividend tax effect. As argued earlier, I expect the coefficient on CYIELD·INST to be negative, due to the difference in information environment between low and high institutional ownership firms. percentile of the change in dividend yield are 0.02%, 0.05% and 0.08%, respectively, suggesting that most of the dividend changes are positive with relatively small magnitudes. The second part of Table 2 shows that there are 8,272 dividend increases and 1,476 dividend decreases. The mean (median) yield change for the increase subsample is 0.08% (0.06%) while that for the decrease subsample is -0.49% (-0.29%). The mean (median) cumulative abnormal return for the increase subsample is 0.52% (0.26%) while that for the decrease subsample is -0.77% (-0.36%). The level of institutional ownership is around 38.5% and it is relatively stable across tax regimes and across positive and negative dividend change subsamples. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix. The change in dividend yield is positively correlated with the announcement cumulative abnormal return while it is negatively correlated with the level of institutional ownership. The Pearson correlation between the change in dividend yield and the expected dividend yield is negative while the Spearman correlation between the change in dividend yield and the expected dividend yield is positive. Table 4 provides regression results for Equation (4). As expected, the coefficient on CYIELD is positive and significant for the full sample and the three subsamples based on low, medium and high levels of institutional ownership. The coefficient on CYIELD·T93
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is not significant in either the full sample or the institutional ownership subsamples, though it increases when the level of institutional ownership increases, as expected. The coefficient on CYIELD·T97 is negative and significant for the full sample, suggesting that as the spread of tax rates on dividend and capital gains increases, the negative tax effect of dividend increases. An F-test suggests that β 5 > β 6 (F = 12.92). This offers support for the Hypothesis 1.
In the low institutional ownership subsample, the coefficient on CYIELD·T97 is negative and significant, since the marginal investor is likely to be a tax disadvantaged individual. In the medium institutional ownership subsample, the coefficient on CYIELD·T97 is insignificant. In the high institutional ownership subsample, the coefficient on CYIELD·T97 is positive and significant, suggesting that as the likelihood of a tax advantaged marginal investor increases, the dividend tax effect may be even positive. This evidence implies that if the marginal investor is tax advantaged, the dividend tax effect and its information effect may work in the same direction. Apart from the main variables of interest, Table 4 shows that the effect of EYIELD is mainly insignificant; the effects of CDIV, CAP and 1/PRICE are marginally positive.
Equation (5) offers an additional test for the full sample. The results are shown in Table 5 . The coefficient on CYIELD is positive and significant (β 5 = 3.1031, t = 8.81), consistent with the dividend information effect. The coefficient on CYIELD·T93 is negative and significant (β 6 = -1.3871, t = -2.38) and the coefficient on CYIELD·T97 is also negative and significant (β 7 = -2.7838, t = -7.40), as expected. An F-test strongly suggests that β 6 > β 7 (F = 8.10 ). This result is consistent with the notion that as the spread of tax rates on dividend and capital gains increases, that is, as the magnitude of the dividend tax penalty increases, the positive information effect of dividend policy is eroded. This evidence offers support for Hypothesis 1.
The coefficient on CYIELD·INST·T93 is positive and significant (β 9 = 4.7480, t = 3.13) and the coefficient on CYIELD·INST·T97 is also positive and significant (β 10 = 7.6585, t = 6.42), as expected. An F-test strongly suggests that β 9 < β 10 (F = 4.11). This result is consistent with the notion that as the level of institutional ownership increases, that is, as the likelihood of a tax advantaged marginal (institutional) investor increases, the negative effect of the dividend tax penalty is mitigated. This evidence offers support for Hypothesis 2.
The coefficient on CYIELD·INST is negative, consistent with the argument that if the firm-level agency cost problem is low (Hartzell and Starks (2003)), the market reaction to the dividend change announcement is low. This result is also consistent with that in Amihud and Li (2002) .
The above results concerning the dividend tax effect are consistent with Ayers, Cloyd and Robinson (2002) who, studying a common event (the passage of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993) to all stocks, find that 1) the higher the firm's dividend yield, the more negative the firm's stock price reaction to the increase in the individual income tax rate; 2) institutional holdings mitigate this negative reaction. In their study, a firm's dividend policy is taken as given while tax rate changes. I study firm-specific events (dividend policy changes) and find results consistent with dividend taxes being incorporated into stock price.
Variable PENALTY and the dividend tax effect
Regression Equation (7) and (8) utilize the variable PENALTY to directly measure the dividend tax penalty and its effect on shareholder wealth. Table 6 shows the results for analyzing Equation (7). For the full sample, the coefficient on CYIELD is positive and 13 My result concerning the effect of CYIELD·PENALTY is opposite to that in Bernheim and Wantz (1994) , who alternatively argue that in a dividend signaling model, the higher the tax cost of dividend, the higher the bang-for-the-buck. My argument is that even if a higher level of dividend tax as a cost prevents imitators, it still represents a cost and its effect should be negative. In my tests, I have two layers of control As in estimating Equation (5), in subsample test, the coefficient on CYIELD decreases as the level of institutional ownership INST increases, consistent with the result in Amihud and Li (2002) . Table 6 also shows that the effects of PENALTY and EYIELD alone are mainly insignificant and that the effects of CDIV, CAP and 1/PRICE are marginally positive.
Equation (8) offers an additional test for the full sample. The results are shown in Table 7 . The coefficient on CYIELD is positive and significant (β 4 = 3.4205, t = 9.23) and the coefficient on CYIELD·PENALTY is negative and significant (β 6 = -12.6048, t = -7.71), supporting Hypothesis 1. The coefficient on CYIELD·INST·PENALTY is positive and significant (β 7 = 37.0807, t = 7.35), supporting Hypothesis 2. Again, the coefficient on CYIELD·INST is negative and significant, as expected (also see Amihud and Li (2002) ).
Economic significance
Base on the regression results in Table 7 , I compute the expected wealth effect per unit of the change in dividend yield CYIELD as a function of the dividend tax penalty PENALTY and the level of institutional ownership INST (see Table 8 ).
When there is no institutional ownership, the wealth effect per unit of CYIELD is 3.4205 during 1989 -1990 (TRA86), 2.8949 during 1991 -1992 (TRA86), 1.3899 during 1993 -1996 (RRA93) and 0.3323 during 1997 -2000 (TRA97). These numbers show a declining trend, suggesting that when the marginal investor is tax disadvantaged on dividend incomes, the information effect of dividend is eroded by its tax effect. When for the tax effect, 1) the tax regime changes or the PENALTY variable; 2) the level of institutional ownership as an indicator of the identity of the marginal investor. My results are consistent with a higher tax rate on dividend eroding its information/agency cost effect and that the presence of institutional investors mitigates this negative tax effect.
INST is at 25%, the wealth effect per unit of CYIELD is 3.4205 during 1989 -1990 (TRA86), 3.2814 during 1991 -1992 (TRA86), 2.8833 during 1993 -1996 (RRA93) and 2.6035 during 1997 -2000 (TRA97). These numbers still show a declining trend, but its slope is less steep than that for firms with no institutional investors, suggesting that the presence of institutional investors mitigate the negative dividend tax effect. When INST is at 50%, the wealth effect per unit of CYIELD actually increases from 3. 4205 during 1989 -1990 (TRA86), to 3.6680 during 1991 -1992 (TRA86), to 4.3767 during 1993 -1996 (RRA93), and to 4.8747 during 1997 -2000 (TRA97). 14 These numbers suggest that if dividend is tax advantaged for a marginal investor, it even enhances its wealth effect. The above numbers appear to be economically significant and reasonable.
Summary and conclusion
I examine whether and how a higher tax rate on dividend incomes (vs. capital gains incomes) impact shareholder wealth around the announcements of dividend policy changes. As in several recent studies, I use the level of institutional ownership to proxy for the tax status of the marginal investor. As the level of institutional ownership increases, the likelihood of a tax advantaged or less tax disadvantaged marginal investor increases. Specifically, I examine how the dividend tax penalty and the level of institutional ownership interact to impact the changes in shareholder wealth around the dividend policy change announcements.
14 The expected wealth effect per unit of the change in dividend yield as a function of PENALTY and INST is computed as: 3.4205 -5.3506PENALTY + 12.6048INST·PENALTY, based on the regression results in Table 7 . The effect of INST alone on CYIELD (INST·CYIELD) is not considered in the above computation because this effect is not deemed tax-related.
I find evidence supporting my hypotheses. First, the dividend tax penalty erodes the positive wealth effect of the information content (or agency cost argument) of dividend at its change announcements; second, the presence of a tax advantaged or less tax disadvantaged marginal investor mitigates the negative tax effect of dividend.
This study contributes to the literature by providing strong evidence of the capitalization of the dividend tax penalty in an event study setting. I also contribute to the literature by separating the negative tax effect of dividend from its positive information or agency cost effect. This offers a fuller picture of the valuation implications of dividend. The dependent variable is the three day (day -1, day 0 and day 1 relative to the dividend change announcement) cumulative abnormal return CAR. Daily normal return is obtained from a CAPM type regression. Specifically, daily stock return is regressed on daily CRSP value-weighted return during a 55-day period from day -60 to day -6 relative to the dividend change announcement in the following manner:
where RET id is return on day d ( The measure of change in dividend yield CYIELD is:
where DIV it is dividend per share for stock i in the current quarter and DIV it-1 is dividend per share for stock i in the previous quarter and PRICE it is the stock price for stock i on day -1 relative to the dividend change announcement. The level of institutional ownership INST is computed as the total number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding. The expected dividend yield EYIELD is the announced dividend per share in the previous quarter scaled by the stock price on day -1 relative to the current dividend change announcement. The change in dividend per share CDIV is the change in dividend per share in the current quarter from the previous quarter scaled by the dividend per share in the previous quarter. Size of the stock CAP is its market capitalization on day -1 relative to the dividend change announcement.
To control for liquidity, I use the inverse of stock price 1/PRICE on day -1 relative to the dividend change announcement. The wealth effect per unit of change in dividend yield is based on the results in Table 7 . It is computed as: 3.4205 -5.3506PENALTY + 12.6048INST·PENALTY.
